Charitable organizations soliciting funds in California generally must register with the Attorney General and renew their registrations annually by filing copies of their IRS Form 990, on which tax-exempt organizations provide the names and addresses of their major donors. Two tax-exempt charities that solicit contributions in California renewed their registrations and filed redacted Form 990s to preserve their donors’ anonymity. The Attorney General threatened the charities with the suspension of their registrations and fines. The charities alleged that the compelled disclosure requirement violated their First Amendment rights and the rights of their donors. The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the Attorney General.
The Supreme Court reversed. California’s disclosure requirement is facially invalid because it burdens donors’ First Amendment rights and is not narrowly tailored to an important government interest. Compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as other forms of governmental action. Exacting scrutiny requires that a government-mandated disclosure regime be narrowly tailored to the government’s asserted interest, even if it is not the least restrictive means of achieving that end.
A dramatic mismatch exists between the Attorney General's asserted interest and the disclosure regime. While California’s interests in preventing charitable fraud and self-dealing are important, the enormous amount of sensitive information collected through the disclosures does not form an integral part of California’s fraud detection efforts. California does not rely on those disclosures to initiate investigations. There is no evidence that alternative means of obtaining the information, such as a subpoena or audit letter, are inefficient and ineffective by comparison. Mere administrative convenience does not “reflect the seriousness of the actual burden” that the disclosure requirement imposes on donors’ association rights. It does not make a difference if there is no public disclosure, if some donors do not mind having their identities revealed, or if the relevant donor information is already disclosed to the IRS.
Annotation Primary HoldingCalifornia's requirement that charities disclose the names and addresses of major donors is facially invalid as burdening donors’ First Amendment rights and not narrowly tailored to an important government interest.
SyllabusSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION v. BONTA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 19–251. Argued April 26, 2021—Decided July 1, 2021[1]
Charitable organizations soliciting funds in California must disclose the identities of their major donors to the state Attorney General’s Office. Charities generally must register with the Attorney General and renew their registrations annually. The Attorney General requires charities renewing their registrations to file copies of their Internal Revenue Service Form 990, a form on which tax-exempt organizations provide information about their mission, leadership, and finances. Schedule B to Form 990—the document that gives rise to the present dispute—requires organizations to disclose the names and addresses of their major donors. The State contends that having this information readily available furthers its interest in policing misconduct by charities.
The petitioners are two tax-exempt charities that solicit contributions in California. Since 2001, each petitioner has renewed its registration and has filed a copy of its Form 990 with the Attorney General, as required by Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, §301. To preserve their donors’ anonymity, however, the petitioners have declined to file unredacted Schedule Bs, and they had until recently faced no consequences for noncompliance. In 2010, the State increased its enforcement of charities’ Schedule B disclosure obligations, and the Attorney General ultimately threatened the petitioners with suspension of their registrations and fines for noncompliance. The petitioners each responded by filing suit in District Court, alleging that the compelled disclosure requirement violated their First Amendment rights and the rights of their donors. Disclosure of their Schedule Bs, the petitioners alleged, would make their donors less likely to contribute and would subject them to the risk of reprisals. Both organizations challenged the constitutionality of the disclosure requirement on its face and as applied to them. In each case, the District Court granted preliminary injunctive relief prohibiting the Attorney General from collecting the petitioners’ Schedule B information. The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded, reasoning that Circuit precedent required rejection of the petitioners’ facial challenge. Reviewing the petitioners’ as-applied claims under an “exacting scrutiny” standard, the panel narrowed the District Court’s injunction, and it allowed the Attorney General to collect the petitioners’ Schedule Bs so long as they were not publicly disclosed. On remand, the District Court held bench trials in both cases, after which it entered judgment for the petitioners and permanently enjoined the Attorney General from collecting their Schedule Bs. Applying exacting scrutiny, the District Court held that disclosure of Schedule Bs was not narrowly tailored to the State’s interest in investigating charitable misconduct. The court found little evidence that the Attorney General’s investigators relied on Schedule Bs to detect charitable fraud, and it determined that the disclosure regime burdened the associational rights of donors. The District Court also found that California was unable to ensure the confidentiality of donors’ information. The Ninth Circuit again vacated the District Court’s injunctions, and this time reversed the judgments and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the Attorney General. The Ninth Circuit held that the District Court had erred by imposing a narrow tailoring requirement. And it reasoned that the disclosure regime satisfied exacting scrutiny because the up-front collection of charities’ Schedule Bs promoted investigative efficiency and effectiveness. The panel also found that the disclosure of Schedule Bs would not meaningfully burden donors’ associational rights. The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, over a dissent.
Held: The judgment is reversed, and the cases are remanded.
903 F.3d 1000, reversed and remanded.
The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to all but Part II–B–1, concluding that California’s disclosure requirement is facially invalid because it burdens donors’ First Amendment rights and is not narrowly tailored to an important government interest. Pp. 6–7, 9–19.
(a) The Court reviews the petitioners’ First Amendment challenge to California’s compelled disclosure requirement with the understanding that “compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as [other] forms of governmental action.” NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462. NAACP v. Alabama did not phrase in precise terms the standard of review that applies to First Amendment challenges to compelled disclosure. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (per curiam), the Court articulated an “exacting scrutiny” standard, which requires “a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important governmental interest,” Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196. The parties dispute whether exacting scrutiny applies in these cases, and if so, whether that test imposes a least restrictive means requirement similar to the one imposed by strict scrutiny.
The Court concludes that exacting scrutiny requires that a government-mandated disclosure regime be narrowly tailored to the government’s asserted interest, even if it is not the least restrictive means of achieving that end. The need for narrow tailoring was set forth early in the Court’s compelled disclosure cases. In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, the Court considered an Arkansas statute that required teachers to disclose every organization to which they belonged or contributed. The Court acknowledged the importance of “the right of a State to investigate the competence and fitness of those whom it hires to teach in its schools,” and it distinguished prior decisions that had found “no substantially relevant correlation between the governmental interest asserted and the State’s effort to compel disclosure.” Id., at 485. But the Court invalidated the Arkansas statute because even a “legitimate and substantial” governmental interest “cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.” Id., at 488. Shelton stands for the proposition that a substantial relation to an important interest is not enough to save a disclosure regime that is insufficiently tailored. Where exacting scrutiny applies, the challenged requirement must be narrowly tailored to the interest it promotes. Pp. 6–7, 9–11.
(b) California’s blanket demand that all charities disclose Schedule Bs to the Attorney General is facially unconstitutional. Pp. 12–19.
(1) The Ninth Circuit did not impose a narrow tailoring requirement to the relationship between the Attorney General’s demand for Schedule Bs and the identified governmental interest. That was error under the Court’s precedents. And properly applied, the narrow tailoring requirement is not satisfied by California’s disclosure regime. In fact, a dramatic mismatch exists between the interest the Attorney General seeks to promote and the disclosure regime that he has implemented.
The Court does not doubt the importance of California’s interest in preventing charitable fraud and self-dealing. But the enormous amount of sensitive information collected through Schedule Bs does not form an integral part of California’s fraud detection efforts. California does not rely on Schedule Bs to initiate investigations, and evidence at trial did not support the State’s concern that alternative means of obtaining Schedule B information—such as a subpoena or audit letter—are inefficient and ineffective compared to up-front collection. In reality, California’s interest is less in investigating fraud and more in ease of administration. But “the prime objective of the First Amendment is not efficiency.” McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 495. Mere administrative convenience does not remotely “reflect the seriousness of the actual burden” that the demand for Schedule Bs imposes on donors’ association rights. Reed, 561 U. S., at 196 (internal quotation marks omitted). Pp. 12–15.
(2) In the First Amendment context, the Court has recognized a “type of facial challenge, whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Attorney General’s disclosure requirement is plainly overbroad under that standard. The regulation lacks any tailoring to the State’s investigative goals, and the State’s interest in administrative convenience is weak. As a result, every demand that might deter association “creates an unnecessary risk of chilling” in violation of the First Amendment. Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 968. It does not make a difference in these cases if there is no disclosure to the public, see Shelton, 364 U. S., at 486, if some donors do not mind having their identities revealed, or if the relevant donor information is already disclosed to the IRS as a condition of federal tax-exempt status. California’s disclosure requirement imposes a widespread burden on donors’ associational rights, and this burden cannot be justified on the ground that the regime is narrowly tailored to investigating charitable wrongdoing, or that the State’s interest in administrative convenience is sufficiently important. Pp. 15–19.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II–B–1. Kavanaugh and Barrett, JJ., joined that opinion in full, Alito and Gorsuch, JJ., joined except as to Part II–B–1, and Thomas, J., joined except as to Parts II–B–1 and III–B. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Gorsuch, J., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer and Kagan, JJ., joined.
Notes 1 Together with No. 19–255, Thomas More Law Center v. Bonta, also on certiorari to the same court. OpinionsNOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 19–251 and 19–255
AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION, PETITIONER
ROB BONTA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA
THOMAS MORE LAW CENTER, PETITIONER
ROB BONTA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA
on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II–B–1.
To solicit contributions in California, charitable organizations must disclose to the state Attorney General’s Office the identities of their major donors. The State contends that having this information on hand makes it easier to police misconduct by charities. We must decide whether California’s disclosure requirement violates the First Amendment right to free association.
The California Attorney General’s Office is responsible for statewide law enforcement, including the supervision and regulation of charitable fundraising. Under state law, the Attorney General is authorized to “establish and maintain a register” of charitable organizations and to obtain “whatever information, copies of instruments, reports, and records are needed for the establishment and maintenance of the register.” Cal. Govt. Code Ann. §12584 (West 2018). In order to operate and raise funds in California, charities generally must register with the Attorney General and renew their registrations annually. §§12585(a), 12586(a). Over 100,000 charities are currently registered in the State, and roughly 60,000 renew their registrations each year.
California law empowers the Attorney General to make rules and regulations regarding the registration and renewal process. §§12585(b), 12586(b). Pursuant to this regulatory authority, the Attorney General requires charities renewing their registrations to file copies of their Internal Revenue Service Form 990, along with any attachments and schedules. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, §301 (2020). Form 990 contains information regarding tax-exempt organizations’ mission, leadership, and finances. Schedule B to Form 990—the document that gives rise to the present dispute—requires organizations to disclose the names and addresses of donors who have contributed more than $5,000 in a particular tax year (or, in some cases, who have given more than 2 percent of an organization’s total contributions). See 26 CFR §§1.6033–2(a)(2)(ii)(f ), (iii) (2020).
The petitioners are tax-exempt charities that solicit contributions in California and are subject to the Attorney General’s registration and renewal requirements. Americans for Prosperity Foundation is a public charity that is “devoted to education and training about the principles of a free and open society, including free markets, civil liberties, immigration reform, and constitutionally limited government.” Brief for Petitioner Foundation 10. Thomas More Law Center is a public interest law firm whose “mission is to protect religious freedom, free speech, family values, and the sanctity of human life.” Brief for Petitioner Law Center 4. Since 2001, each petitioner has renewed its registration and has filed a copy of its Form 990 with the Attorney General, as required by Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, §301. Out of concern for their donors’ anonymity, however, the petitioners have declined to file their Schedule Bs (or have filed only redacted versions) with the State.
For many years, the petitioners’ reluctance to turn over donor information presented no problem because the Attorney General was not particularly zealous about collecting Schedule Bs. That changed in 2010, when the California Department of Justice “ramped up its efforts to enforce charities’ Schedule B obligations, sending thousands of deficiency letters to charities that had not complied with the Schedule B requirement.” Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Becerra, 903 F.3d 1000, 1006 (CA9 2018). The Law Center and the Foundation received deficiency letters in 2012 and 2013, respectively. When they continued to resist disclosing their contributors’ identities, the Attorney General threatened to suspend their registrations and fine their directors and officers.
The petitioners each responded by filing suit in the Central District of California. In their complaints, they alleged that the Attorney General had violated their First Amendment rights and the rights of their donors. The petitioners alleged that disclosure of their Schedule Bs would make their donors less likely to contribute and would subject them to the risk of reprisals. Both organizations challenged the disclosure requirement on its face and as applied to them.
In each case, the District Court granted preliminary injunctive relief prohibiting the Attorney General from collecting their Schedule B information. Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Harris, 2015 WL 769778 (CD Cal., Feb. 23, 2015); App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 19–255, pp. 90a–96a. The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded. Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Harris, 809 F.3d 536 (2015) (per curiam). The court held that it was bound by Circuit precedent to reject the petitioners’ facial challenge. Id., at 538 (citing Center for Competitive Politics v. Harris, 784 F.3d 1307, 1317 (2015)). And reviewing the petitioners’ as-applied claims under an “exacting scrutiny” standard, the panel narrowed the injunction, allowing the Attorney General to collect the petitioners’ Schedule Bs so long as he did not publicly disclose them. 809 F. 3d, at 538, 543.
On remand, the District Court held bench trials in both cases, after which it entered judgment for the petitioners and permanently enjoined the Attorney General from collecting their Schedule Bs. Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Harris, 182 F. Supp. 3d 1049 (CD Cal. 2016); Thomas More Law Center v. Harris, 2016 WL 6781090 (CD Cal., Nov. 16, 2016). Applying exacting scrutiny, the District Court held that disclosure of Schedule Bs was not narrowly tailored to the State’s interest in investigating charitable misconduct. The court credited testimony from California officials that Schedule Bs were rarely used to audit or investigate charities. And it found that even where Schedule B information was used, that information could be obtained from other sources.
The court also determined that the disclosure regime burdened the associational rights of donors. In both cases, the court found that the petitioners had suffered from threats and harassment in the past, and that donors were likely to face similar retaliation in the future if their affiliations became publicly known. For example, the CEO of the Foundation testified that a technology contractor working at the Foundation’s headquarters had posted online that he was “inside the belly of the beast” and “could easily walk into [the CEO’s] office and slit his throat.” 182 F. Supp. 3d, at 1056. And the Law Center introduced evidence that it had received “threats, harassing calls, intimidating and obscene emails, and even pornographic letters.” 2016 WL 6781090, *4.
The District Court also found that California was unable to ensure the confidentiality of donors’ information. During the course of litigation, the Foundation identified nearly 2,000 confidential Schedule Bs that had been inadvertently posted to the Attorney General’s website, including dozens that were found the day before trial. One of the Foundation’s expert witnesses also discovered that he was able to access hundreds of thousands of confidential documents on the website simply by changing a digit in the URL. The court found after trial that “the amount of careless mistakes made by the Attorney General’s Registry is shocking.” 182 F. Supp. 3d, at 1057. And although California subsequently codified a policy prohibiting disclosure, Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, §310(b)—an effort the District Court described as “commendable”—the court determined that “[d]onors and potential donors would be reasonably justified in a fear of disclosure given such a context” of past breaches. 2016 WL 6781090, *5.
The Ninth Circuit again vacated the District Court’s injunctions, and this time reversed the judgments and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the Attorney General. 903 F.3d 1000. The court held that the District Court had erred by imposing a narrow tailoring requirement. Id., at 1008–1009. And it reasoned that the disclosure regime satisfied exacting scrutiny because the up-front collection of charities’ Schedule Bs promoted investigative efficiency and effectiveness. Id., at 1009–1012. The panel also found that the disclosure of Schedule Bs would not meaningfully burden donors’ associational rights, in part because the Attorney General had taken remedial security measures to fix the confidentiality breaches identified at trial. Id., at 1013–1019.
The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Becerra, 919 F.3d 1177 (2019). Judge Ikuta dissented, joined by four other judges. In her view, the panel had impermissibly overridden the District Court’s factual findings and evaluated the disclosure requirement under too lenient a degree of scrutiny. Id., at 1184–1187.
We granted certiorari. 592 U. S. ___ (2021).
The First Amendment prohibits government from “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” This Court has “long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others.” Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). Protected association furthers “a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends,” and “is especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression by the majority.” Ibid. Government infringement of this freedom “can take a number of forms.” Ibid. We have held, for example, that the freedom of association may be violated where a group is required to take in members it does not want, see id., at 623, where individuals are punished for their political affiliation, see Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355 (1976) (plurality opinion), or where members of an organization are denied benefits based on the organization’s message, see Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181–182 (1972).
We have also noted that “[i]t is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as [other] forms of governmental action.” NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). NAACP v. Alabama involved this chilling effect in its starkest form. The NAACP opened an Alabama office that supported racial integration in higher education and public transportation. Id., at 452. In response, NAACP members were threatened with economic reprisals and violence. Id., at 462. As part of an effort to oust the organization from the State, the Alabama Attorney General sought the group’s membership lists. Id., at 452–453. We held that the First Amendment prohibited such compelled disclosure. Id., at 466. We explained that “[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association,” id., at 460, and we noted “the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations,” id., at 462. Because NAACP members faced a risk of reprisals if their affiliation with the organization became known—and because Alabama had demonstrated no offsetting interest “sufficient to justify the deterrent effect” of disclosure, id., at 463—we concluded that the State’s demand violated the First Amendment.
NAACP v. Alabama did not phrase in precise terms the standard of review that applies to First Amendment challenges to compelled disclosure. We have since settled on a standard referred to as “exacting scrutiny.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam). Under that standard, there must be “a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important governmental interest.” Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To withstand this scrutiny, the strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment rights.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Such scrutiny, we have held, is appropriate given the “deterrent effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights” that arises as an “inevitable result of the government’s conduct in requiring disclosure.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 65.
The Law Center (but not the Foundation) argues that we should apply strict scrutiny, not exacting scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, the government must adopt “the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest,” McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014), rather than a means substantially related to a sufficiently important interest. The Law Center contends that only strict scrutiny adequately protects the associational rights of charities. And although the Law Center acknowledges that we have applied exacting scrutiny in prior disclosure cases, it argues that those cases arose in the electoral context, where the government’s important interests justify less searching review.
It is true that we first enunciated the exacting scrutiny standard in a campaign finance case. See Buckley, 424 U. S., at 64–68. And we have since invoked it in other election-related settings. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 366–367 (2010); Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 744 (2008). But exacting scrutiny is not unique to electoral disclosure regimes. To the contrary, Buckley derived the test from NAACP v. Alabama itself, as well as other nonelection cases. See 424 U. S., at 64 (citing Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960)). As we explained in NAACP v. Alabama, “it is immaterial” to the level of scrutiny “whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters.” 357 U. S., at 460–461. Regardless of the type of association, compelled disclosure requirements are reviewed under exacting scrutiny.
The Law Center (now joined by the Foundation) argues in the alternative that even if exacting scrutiny applies, such review incorporates a least restrictive means test similar to the one imposed by strict scrutiny. The United States and the Attorney General respond that exacting scrutiny demands no additional tailoring beyond the “substantial relation” requirement noted above. We think that the answer lies between those two positions. While exacting scrutiny does not require that disclosure regimes be the least restrictive means of achieving their ends, it does require that they be narrowly tailored to the government’s asserted interest.
The need for narrow tailoring was set forth early in our compelled disclosure cases. In Shelton v. Tucker, we considered an Arkansas statute that required teachers to disclose every organization to which they belonged or contributed. 364 U. S., at 480. We acknowledged the importance of “the right of a State to investigate the competence and fitness of those whom it hires to teach in its schools.” Id., at 485. On that basis, we distinguished prior decisions in which we had found “no substantially relevant correlation between the governmental interest asserted and the State’s effort to compel disclosure.” Ibid. But we nevertheless held that the Arkansas statute was invalid because even a “legitimate and substantial” governmental interest “cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.” Id., at 488; see also Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961) (quoting same).
Shelton stands for the proposition that a substantial relation to an important interest is not enough to save a disclosure regime that is insufficiently tailored. This requirement makes sense. Narrow tailoring is crucial where First Amendment activity is chilled—even if indirectly—“[b]ecause First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive.” Button, 371 U. S., at 433.
Our more recent decisions confirm the need for tailoring. In McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U.S. 185 (2014), for example, a plurality of the Court explained:
“In the First Amendment context, fit matters. Even when the Court is not applying strict scrutiny, we still require a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served, that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.” Id., at 218 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
McCutcheon is instructive here. A substantial relation is necessary but not sufficient to ensure that the government adequately considers the potential for First Amendment harms before requiring that organizations reveal sensitive information about their members and supporters. Where exacting scrutiny applies, the challenged requirement must be narrowly tailored to the interest it promotes, even if it is not the least restrictive means of achieving that end.
The dissent reads our cases differently. It focuses on the words “broadly stifle” in the quotation from Shelton above, and it interprets those words to mean that narrow tailoring is required only for disclosure regimes that “impose a severe burden on associational rights.” Post, at 13 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.). Because, in the dissent’s view, the petitioners have not shown such a burden here, narrow tailoring is not required.
We respectfully disagree. The “government may regulate in the [ First Amendment] area only with narrow specificity,” Button, 371 U. S., at 433, and compelled disclosure regimes are no exception. When it comes to “a person’s beliefs and associations,” “[b]road and sweeping state inquiries into these protected areas . . . discourage citizens from exercising rights protected by the Constitution.” Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971) (plurality opinion). Contrary to the dissent, we understand this Court’s discussion of rules that are “broad” and “broadly stifle” First Amendment freedoms to refer to the scope of challenged restrictions—their breadth—rather than the severity of any demonstrated burden. That much seems clear to us from Shelton’s statement (in the sentence following the one quoted by the dissent) that “[t]he breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.” 364 U. S., at 488; see id., at 488, n. 9 (citing sources that support this reading). It also seems clear from the immediately preceding paragraph, which stressed that “[t]he scope of the inquiry required by [the law] is completely unlimited. . . . It requires [the teacher] to list, without number, every conceivable kind of associational tie—social, professional, political, avocational, or religious. Many such relationships could have no possible bearing upon the teacher’s occupational competence or fitness.” Id., at 488. In other words, the law was not narrowly tailored to the State’s objective.
Nor does our decision in Reed suggest that narrow tailoring is required only for laws that impose severe burdens. The dissent casts Reed as a case involving only “ ‘modest burdens,’ ” and therefore “a correspondingly modest level of tailoring.” Post, at 12 (quoting 561 U. S., at 201). But it was only after we concluded that various narrower alternatives proposed by the plaintiffs were inadequate, see 561 U. S., at 198–199, that we held that the strength of the government’s interest in disclosure reflected the burden imposed, see id., at 201. The point is that a reasonable assessment of the burdens imposed by disclosure should begin with an understanding of the extent to which the burdens are unnecessary, and that requires narrow tailoring.
The Foundation and the Law Center both argued below that the obligation to disclose Schedule Bs to the Attorney General was unconstitutional on its face and as applied to them. See 903 F. 3d, at 1007. The petitioners renew their facial challenge in this Court, and they argue in the alternative that they are entitled to as-applied relief. For the reasons below, we conclude that California’s blanket demand for Schedule Bs is facially unconstitutional.
As explained, exacting scrutiny requires that there be “a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important governmental interest,” Reed, 561 U. S., at 196 (internal quotation marks omitted), and that the disclosure requirement be narrowly tailored to the interest it promotes, see Shelton, 364 U. S., at 488. The Ninth Circuit found that there was a substantial relation between the Attorney General’s demand for Schedule Bs and a sufficiently strong governmental interest. 903 F. 3d, at 1008–1020. Of particular relevance, the court found that California had such an interest in preventing charitable fraud and self-dealing, and that “the up-front collection of Schedule B information improves the efficiency and efficacy of the Attorney General’s important regulatory efforts.” Id., at 1011–1012. The court did not apply a narrow tailoring requirement, however, because it did not read our cases to mandate any such inquiry. Id., at 1008–1009. That was error. And properly applied, the narrow tailoring requirement is not satisfied by the disclosure regime.
We do not doubt that California has an important interest in preventing wrongdoing by charitable organizations. It goes without saying that there is a “substantial governmental interest[ ] in protecting the public from fraud.” Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Attorney General receives complaints each month that identify a range of misconduct, from “misuse, misappropriation, and diversion of charitable assets,” to “false and misleading charitable solicitations,” to other “improper activities by charities soliciting charitable donations.” App. in No. 19–255, p. 270 (alteration omitted). Such offenses cause serious social harms. And the Attorney General is the primary law enforcement officer charged with combating them under California law. See Cal. Govt. Code Ann. §12598.
There is a dramatic mismatch, however, between the interest that the Attorney General seeks to promote and the disclosure regime that he has implemented in service of that end. Recall that 60,000 charities renew their registrations each year, and nearly all are required to file a Schedule B. Each Schedule B, in turn, contains information about a charity’s top donors—a small handful of individuals in some cases, but hundreds in others. See App. in No. 19–251, p. 319. This information includes donors’ names and the total contributions they have made to the charity, as well as their addresses.
Given the amount and sensitivity of this information harvested by the State, one would expect Schedule B collection to form an integral part of California’s fraud detection efforts. It does not. To the contrary, the record amply supports the District Court’s finding that there was not “a single, concrete instance in which pre-investigation collection of a Schedule B did anything to advance the Attorney General’s investigative, regulatory or enforcement efforts.” 182 F. Supp. 3d, at 1055.
The dissent devotes much of its analysis to relitigating factual disputes that the District Court resolved against the Attorney General, see post, at 16–20, notwithstanding the applicable clear error standard of review, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a). For example, the dissent echoes the State’s argument that, in some cases, it relies on up-front Schedule B collection to prevent and police fraud. See post, at 18–19. But the record before the District Court tells a different story. See, e.g., App. in No. 19–251, at 397, 403, 417. And even if the State relied on up-front collection in some cases, its showing falls far short of satisfying the means-end fit that exacting scrutiny requires. California is not free to enforce any disclosure regime that furthers its interests. It must instead demonstrate its need for universal production in light of any less intrusive alternatives. Cf. Shelton, 364 U. S., at 488.
The Attorney General and the dissent contend that alternative means of obtaining Schedule B information—such as a subpoena or audit letter—are inefficient and ineffective compared to up-front collection. See post, at 19. It became clear at trial, however, that the Office had not even considered alternatives to the current disclosure requirement. See App. in No. 19–251, at 421 (“I see no reason to change what we’ve been doing.”). The Attorney General and the dissent also argue that a targeted request for Schedule B information could tip a charity off, causing it to “hide or tamper with evidence.” Brief for Respondent 43; see post, at 19–20. But again, the States’ witnesses failed to substantiate that concern. See, e.g., App. in No. 19–251, at 405–406; see also Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (“the State . . . must affirmatively establish the reasonable fit we require”). Nor do the actions of investigators suggest a risk of tipping off charities under suspicion, as the standard practice is to send audit letters asking for a wide range of information early in the investigative process. See App. in No. 19–251, at 406, 411, 418. Furthermore, even if tipoff were a concern in some cases, the State’s indiscriminate collection of Schedule Bs in all cases would not be justified.
The upshot is that California casts a dragnet for sensitive donor information from tens of thousands of charities each year, even though that information will become relevant in only a small number of cases involving filed complaints. See id., at 307–308. California does not rely on Schedule Bs to initiate investigations, and in all events, there are multiple alternative mechanisms through which the Attorney General can obtain Schedule B information after initiating an investigation. The need for up-front collection is particularly dubious given that California—one of only three States to impose such a requirement, see id., at 420—did not rigorously enforce the disclosure obligation until 2010. Certainly, this is not a regime “whose scope is in proportion to the interest served.” McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 218 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In reality, then, California’s interest is less in investigating fraud and more in ease of administration. This interest, however, cannot justify the disclosure requirement. The Attorney General may well prefer to have every charity’s information close at hand, just in case. But “the prime objective of the First Amendment is not efficiency.” McCullen, 573 U. S., at 495. Mere administrative convenience does not remotely “reflect the seriousness of the actual burden” that the demand for Schedule Bs imposes on donors’ association rights. Reed, 561 U. S., at 196 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The foregoing discussion also makes clear why a facial challenge is appropriate in these cases. Normally, a plaintiff bringing a facial challenge must “establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid,” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), or show that the law lacks “a plainly legitimate sweep,” Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the First Amendment context, however, we have recognized “a second type of facial challenge, whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have no trouble concluding here that the Attorney General’s disclosure requirement is overbroad. The lack of tailoring to the State’s investigative goals is categorical—present in every case—as is the weakness of the State’s interest in administrative convenience. Every demand that might chill association therefore fails exacting scrutiny.
The Attorney General tries to downplay the burden on donors, arguing that “there is no basis on which to conclude that California’s requirement results in any broad-based chill.” Brief for Respondent 36. He emphasizes that “California’s Schedule B requirement is confidential,” and he suggests that certain donors—like those who give to noncontroversial charities—are unlikely to be deterred from contributing. Id., at 36–37. He also contends that disclosure to his office imposes no added burdens on donors because tax-exempt charities already provide their Schedule Bs to the IRS. Id., at 37.
We are unpersuaded. Our cases have said that disclosure requirements can chill association “[e]ven if there [is] no disclosure to the general public.” Shelton, 364 U. S., at 486. In Shelton, for example, we noted the “constant and heavy” pressure teachers would experience simply by disclosing their associational ties to their schools. Ibid. Exacting scrutiny is triggered by “state action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate,” and by the “possible deterrent effect” of disclosure. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S., at 460–461 (emphasis added); see Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960) (“identification and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance” (emphasis added)). While assurances of confidentiality may reduce the burden of disclosure to the State, they do not eliminate it.[1]*
It is irrelevant, moreover, that some donors might not mind—or might even prefer—the disclosure of their identities to the State. The disclosure requirement “creates an unnecessary risk of chilling” in violation of the First Amendment, Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 968 (1984), indiscriminately sweeping up the information of every major donor with reason to remain anonymous. The petitioners here, for example, introduced evidence that they and their supporters have been subjected to bomb threats, protests, stalking, and physical violence. App. in No. 19–251, at 256, 291–292. Such risks are heightened in the 21st century and seem to grow with each passing year, as “anyone with access to a computer [can] compile a wealth of information about” anyone else, including such sensitive details as a person’s home address or the school attended by his children. Reed, 561 U. S., at 208 (Alito, J., concurring).
The gravity of the privacy concerns in this context is further underscored by the filings of hundreds of organizations as amici curiae in support of the petitioners. Far from representing uniquely sensitive causes, these organizations span the ideological spectrum, and indeed the full range of human endeavors: from the American Civil Liberties Union to the Proposition 8 Legal Defense Fund; from the Council on American-Islamic Relations to the Zionist Organization of America; from Feeding America—Eastern Wisconsin to PBS Reno. The deterrent effect feared by these organizations is real and pervasive, even if their concerns are not shared by every single charity operating or raising funds in California.
The dissent argues that—regardless of the defects in California’s disclosure regime—a facial challenge cannot succeed unless a plaintiff shows that donors to a substantial number of organizations will be subjected to harassment and reprisals. See post, at 21, n. 11. As we have explained, plaintiffs may be required to bear this evidentiary burden where the challenged regime is narrowly tailored to an important government interest. See supra, at 10–11. Such a demanding showing is not required, however, where—as here—the disclosure law fails to satisfy these criteria.
Finally, California’s demand for Schedule Bs cannot be saved by the fact that donor information is already disclosed to the IRS as a condition of federal tax-exempt status. For one thing, each governmental demand for disclosure brings with it an additional risk of chill. For another, revenue collection efforts and conferral of tax-exempt status may raise issues not presented by California’s disclosure requirement, which can prevent charities from operating in the State altogether. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983); see also Schaumburg, 444 U. S., at 633 ( First Amendment protects right to solicit charitable contributions).
We are left to conclude that the Attorney General’s disclosure requirement imposes a widespread burden on donors’ associational rights. And this burden cannot be justified on the ground that the regime is narrowly tailored to investigating charitable wrongdoing, or that the State’s interest in administrative convenience is sufficiently important. We therefore hold that the up-front collection of Schedule Bs is facially unconstitutional, because it fails exacting scrutiny in “a substantial number of its applications . . . judged in relation to [its] plainly legitimate sweep.” Stevens, 559 U. S., at 473 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The dissent concludes by saying that it would be “sympathetic” if we “had simply granted as-applied relief to petitioners based on [our] reading of the facts.” Post, at 25. But the pertinent facts in these cases are the same across the board: Schedule Bs are not used to initiate investigations. That is true in every case. California has not considered alternatives to indiscriminate up-front disclosure. That is true in every case. And the State’s interest in amassing sensitive information for its own convenience is weak. That is true in every case. When it comes to the freedom of association, the protections of the First Amendment are triggered not only by actual restrictions on an individual’s ability to join with others to further shared goals. The risk of a chilling effect on association is enough, “[b]ecause First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive.” Button, 371 U. S., at 433.
The District Court correctly entered judgment in favor of the petitioners and permanently enjoined the Attorney General from collecting their Schedule Bs. The Ninth Circuit erred by vacating those injunctions and directing entry of judgment for the Attorney General. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Notes1 * Here the State’s assurances of confidentiality are not worth much. The dissent acknowledges that the Foundation and Law Center “have unquestionably provided evidence that their donors face a reasonable probability of threats, harassment, and reprisals if their affiliations are made public,” but it concludes that the petitioners have no cause for concern because the Attorney General “has implemented security measures to ensure that Schedule B information remains confidential.” Post, at 15 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.). The District Court—whose findings, again, we review only for clear error—disagreed. After two full bench trials, the court found that the Attorney General’s promise of confidentiality “rings hollow,” and that “[d]onors and potential donors would be reasonably justified in a fear of disclosure.” Thomas More Law Center v. Harris, 2016 WL 6781090, *5 (CD Cal., Nov. 16, 2016).